POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSFERRING PATIENTS TO PRIVATE PRACTICE by Paula González




Correspondence: Universidad de Alicante. Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis
Económico. Apdo. Correos 99. 03080 Alicante (Spain). Phone: (34) 965 90 36 14, Ext.
2627. Fax. (34) 965 90 38 98. E-mail: paula@merlin.fae.ua.es.
Editor: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A.
Fi rst Edition July 2002.
Dep ósito Legal: V-2752-2002
IVIE working papers oﬀer in advance the results of economic research under way in or-
der to encourage a discussion process before sending them to scientiﬁc journals for their ﬁnal
publication.
* I am truly grateful to Carmen Herrero and Javier López-Cuñat for their invaluable help and support.
I also would like to thank Izabela Jelovac, Inés Macho-Stadler, Pau Olivella, Nicolás Porteiro and the
participants at the I Encuentro de Economía Industrial (Barcelona) and at the 2nd Health Economics
Workshop (Lisbon) for their helpful comments. Financial support from the Generalitat Valenciana Project
GV01-371 and from the IVIE is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimers apply.
** University of Alicante.  1
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSFERRING 








A B S T R A C T 
 
We construct a model to analyze the willingness of Health Authorities to 
reach agreements with private hospitals t o  h a v e  s o m e  o f  t h e i r  p u b l i c  s e c t o r  
patients treated there. When physicians are dual suppliers, we show that a 
problem of cream-skimming arises and reduces the incentives of the 
government to undertake such a policy. We argue that the more disperse the 
severities of the patients are, the greater the reduction in the incentives will be. 
Moreover, we characterize the distortion that the cream-skimming 
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Public health services, worldwide, are plagued by over-crowding and lengthy waiting-lists.
This unsatisfactory situation has persisted from the very inception of most public health
systems and, far from improving, it seems to get more systematic over the years. The
general population is particularly sensitive to the congestion within the system as they
su¤er the direct e¤ects of long waiting-lists for urgently needed operations.
The general discomfort caused by the back-log has been forcing several national health
authorities, the Spanish Ministry of Health included, to turn to private hospitals and
clinics for assistance in reducing their ever-increasing waiting-lists.1 The Spanish Health
Authority, moreover, in an e¤ort to optimize its health system, not only allows certain
patients on its Social Security waiting-lists to be treated at private hospitals, but also
uses its own operating-theaters outside regular working hours.
At the Spanish regional level, the Catalonian government approved a budget of almost
seven million Euros to shorten waiting-lists during 2001.2 The Valencian Region has been
undertaking the policy of transferring patients to private hospitals over the last years. As
a consequence, more than100.000social security patients were treated at private hospitals
from July 1996 to June 2000. Moreover, in this region 4.26 million Euros were spent last
year to defray the debt to private clinics that have participated in the “Impact Plan” for
reducing surgical waiting-lists.3
Such temporary programs, however, cannot solve the problem and can turn out to
be extremely costly. Finding the correct balance between cost-containment and improve-
ments in the provision of health care services has, therefore, became a major endeavor in
most European economies.
This makes the study of the adequacy and optimality of the policies of distributing
patients between the public and private sectors crucial. There is quite a lot of controversy
over whether hospital specialists are able to in‡uence and manage these waiting-lists for
elective surgery to their own private bene…t, which would generate an important negative
impact on the public sector budget.
1The British government, in addition to this, has recently decided to allow a signi…cant percentage of
its patients awaiting surgery to be operated in France.
2See, for instance, the journal “La Vanguardia”, 19th April 2001.
3See the journal “Información”, 4th January 2001.
2It is common in countries with public health services and waiting-lists, that the doc-
tors who work for government hospitals also have their private practice. In the UK, for
instance, most private medical services are provided by physicians whose main commit-
ment is to their public sector duties. A report by the Competition Commission (1994),
estimated that 61% of NHS physicians in the UK have signi…cant private practices. In ad-
dition to this, and according to Yates (1995), an NHS specialist undertakes, on average,
two private operations a week. In the Southern European countries, this phenomenon
seems to be even more common.
Furthermore, there is a signi…cant di¤erence between the forms of payment to the
doctors in the public and private sectors. In the private practice the physician charges a
fee for his services, while in the public sector he has a …xed salary.
These twofeatures, doctorsacting inboth private andpublic sectoranddi¤erentremu-
nerationschemes inboth sectors, raise abasic matter. Patient-selection(cream-skimming)
by the physicians may appear, i.e., the physicians can have incentives to strategically di-
vert the easiest cases to their private practice.4
This behavior, moreover, can hardly be avoided, as the evaluation of the diagnostic
information required to assess the severity of a patient can only be performedby a trained
physician. The control over the severities of the patients who receive treatment in each
sector is, therefore, likely to be out of the monitoring capacity of the Health Authority.5
The aim of this paper is to analyze the consequences of transferring patients to private
practices, and the circumstances under which the Health Authority should implement it.
In our analysis, it is implicitly assumed that the private sector is operating under
capacity. This is also an empirical observation. For instance, Bosanquet (1999) states that
“at present, there is under-occupation in private hospitals (in the UK), with occupancy
rates at 50% or less”.
Our starting point is a simple model inwhich the policy-maker (the HealthAuthority)
contracts a hospital specialist for treating patients with di¤erent severities, and reaches
4Cream-skimming may also appear in other frameworks. For instance, the editorial of The Economist
(1998) addresses the criticism directed towards Health Maintenance Organizations in the US for excluding
costly cases.
5Arrow (1963) was the …rst to analyze the health care market, taking the di¤erences of information
held by the di¤erent agents involved into account. Gaynor (1994) and Propper (1995) provide interesting
discussions about this topic.
3agreements with private hospitals to have the remaining patients treated there. The
Health Authority agrees to pay a …xed fee per operation performed by the private sector.
Our analysis is appropriate for treatments when the patient’s condition is not life-
threatening inthe absenceof treatment. Thesemedical disciplines usually require facilities
that both the public and the private sectors possess. Hence, it is reasonable to consider,
as we do in this model, that there are no di¤erences in quality between the two sectors.
Moreover, these non-urgent treatments are precisely the ones included in most plans for
diverting patients.
The objective of our work is two-fold. On the onehand, wecharacterizethe physician’s
behavior when the government undertakes a policy of transferring some of the public
health patients to private practice. We show that when the government is not able to
monitor the physician’s behavior with regard to which severities to treat, a problem of
cream-skimming arises. The physician will transfer the least severe cases to the private
sector.
On the other hand, we also study how this feature a¤ects the decision of the Health
Authority concerning when to carry out the policy and how to distribute the patients
between the two sectors. We show that the presence of cream-skimming reduces the
incentives of the Health Authority to undertake the policy. The reason for this is the
increase in the costs borne by the public sector due to the existence of patient-selection.
The fact that the physician only transfers the mildest cases to private practice, increases
the average severity of those patients who remain in the public sector and the expenditure
the Health Authority faces also increases.
We …nd, moreover, that the relevant measure for evaluating the importance of the
problem of patient-selection is the relative dispersion of the severities of the patients. The
higher the dispersion is, the more the physician earns from selecting patients and, at the
same time, the greater the impact on the costs borne by the Health Authority is.
We also characterize the distortion that the cream-skimming phenomenon imposes
on the characteristics of the policy of transferring patients (when it is eventually imple-
mented). This helps us to establish comparisons with the actual performance of these
kinds of measures. In this respect, there is empirical evidence supporting the idea that,
when the policy is undertaken, the number of operations that are performed in the public
sector decrease slightly. Our model provides rationality to this phenomenon, based on
4the strategic behavior of the physicians. Since they keep the most severe patients in the
public sector, the amount of patients that can be treated there, for a given level of e¤ort,
is reduced.
The physician’s response to the form of the compensation contract has been widely
covered by the literature, which generally focuses on retrospective versus capitation reim-
bursement methods. The main concern of these works is the e¤ect of the reimbursement
rule on either the intensity of health services (see, for instance, Ellis and McGuire (1986,
1990), Selden (1990), Blomqvist (1991), and Rickman and McGuire (1999)), or on the
provider selection of who will be treated (see, for instance, Dranove (1997)), or both on
the intensity and extent of the treatment (see, for instance, Ma (1994), Ellis (1999)). Only
Rickman and McGuire (1999) consider, as we do, the fact that the physician can supply
either private health-care to a patient or public.
In our model, intensity of treatment is not considered, as we focus exclusively on
the physician’s selection of patients. Even if this were the aim of some of the papers
mentioned above, our approach is quite di¤erent from theirs. We take the remuneration
system as given (and …xed) by the institutional framework and we study the reaction of
the policy-maker to the potential strategic behavior of the physician. Hence, in our work,
cream-skimming does not appear as a consequence of the remuneration system chosen by
the Public Authority, but rather due to the di¤erent structure of payments in the public
and private sectors.
This paper should also be included in the literature that considers a mix of public and
private sector services provided by physicians. Iversen (1997) has modelled the impact of
publicsector waiting-lists onthedemandforprivatecare. Heconcentrates on the patient’s
decision. He assumes that all patients who are willing to pay for private treatment are
servedintheprivate sector. As such, he clearly rules out thepossibility ofcream-skimming
on the part of the doctors.
Patient-selection by the physician is also ruled out in Olivella (2001). He analyzes
the incentives of the public health administration (…xing long waiting times for public
treatments) todivert costs from the public to the private sector andstudies the conditions
under which this deviation enhances welfare. In our model, such a behavior does not
appear since it is the Health Authority who pays the cost of treating all the social security
patients (independently of where they are treated).
5Finally, the doctor’s strategic behavior plays an important role in Barros and Olivella
(1999). However, the di¤erent systems of remunerating the physicians in either sector
(which is the crucial variable in our model) is not considered in their work. Patient-
selection arises mainly from a combination of: the rationing policy undertaken by the
Health Authority, the criterion of the private physician regarding which severities he is
willing to treat and the decision of the patients to leave the queue in the public sector
and resort to private treatment (paying a ‡at fee). In our model, patients are completely
passive agents and no rationing policy is considered. This gives the full power to decide
to the physician and, thus, always generates a situation of “full cream-skimming”.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the following section we present the
model. Section 3 computes the optimal policy in the benchmark scenario. In section 4 we
study the behavior of the physician concerning the selection of patients and the response
of the Health Authority. In Section 5, we show how our results can be extended to several
variants of our model. Finally, Section 6 provides some concluding remarks and the policy
implications of our analysis. All of the proofs are in the Appendix.
2 THE MODEL
There is a continuum of individuals requiring health care, all of whom demand elective
treatment. The size of this population of potential patients is normalized to N. These
patients are homogeneous, except for their degree of severity, which is measured by the
random variable s: This variable is distributed according to adensity functionf(s) de…ned
on (s;¹ s) which we assume to be uniform. Let ¢s = ¹ s ¡ s be the di¤erence between the
extremes of the domain for s: A patient with severity s is assumed to obtain a bene…t
from a treatment de…ned by Qs; (Q can be, for instance, a monetary value associated to
the QALYs).
We consider a situationin whichthe social pressure on the Health Authority to reduce
theexcessivecongestionin thepublichealthservice is severe. To do so, theHealth Author-
ity undertakes a policy in which the potential population of patients receives treatment
within a given period of time. Note that this construction is equivalent to considering
6According to Barros and Olivella (1999), “full cream-skimming” is a situation in which all the mildest
patients end up being treated in the private sector.
6that only a fraction of patients is treated, and that this amount is exogenously given in
our model and re‡ected by N.
For this purpose, the Health Authority contracts an agent, represented by a specialist,
to treat a certain number of patients and reaches agreements with private hospitals to
have the remaining patients treated there.7 We denote by x the number of operations
performed in the public sector; hence, N ¡ x patients will be transferred to the private
sector.
When treating patients, the Health Authority incurs in two di¤erent kinds of costs
in the public sector: a transfer T to the physician it contracts and a constant cost of
treatment kpb per patient. We take the cost of the public treatment to be linear for the
sake of expositional clarity. In Section 5, we provide some insights into the robustness of
our results to other more general cost structures.
Moreover, in order to be consistent with real-life observations, we assume that the
Health Authority makes a constant payment for each operation sent to the private sector.
This payment covers both, the fee agreed with the private specialist (w) and the cost
of providing treatment to each patient in the private sector (kpv). The private cost of
treatment is likely to be linear if the private sector is operating well under capacity.
With this construction, we allow for di¤erences in the cost of providing treatment in
both systems. For the sake of clarity, we de…ne ¢k = kpb¡ kpv, as the di¤erence between
the costs of treatment in either sector. Although, in principle, we impose no restrictions
on the sign of ¢k, it may be reasonable to consider the case of ¢k > 0 more likely
to occur. This can be sustained on the grounds of dis-economies of scale or congestion
problems in the public sector, as well as bureaucratic or administrative ine¢ciencies.8
We model the physicians’ behavior as being that of a single representative agent. As
we argued in the Introduction, the fact that the same doctor may work in both private
and public practice is a common feature in Europe. We model this by assuming that
the doctor who undertakes the operations in the public sector (in the morning, say) also
works for a private hospital (in the afternoon). In de…ning the utility of the physician,
7The private and public practice may even be done in the same hospital, under di¤erent types of
contracts.
8In favor of this argument, data from Norway indicates that for some types of treatment the price
charged by private hospitals is considerably lower than the costs in public hospitals. A further discussion
of these cost di¤erences is given in Hoel and Sæther (2000).
7therefore, we must not only take his revenues and costs in the public sector into account,
but those in his private practice as well.
In order to perform his tasks, thephysician has to exert somee¤ort (epb for thepatients
he treats in the public sector and epv for those treated in private). These levels of e¤ort
depend on the number of patients he treats in each sector (x and N ¡ x, respectively)
and on the average severity of the patients (b spb and b spv). We de…ne the e¤ort as the
product of these two components. The cost borne by the physician is also a¤ected by a
parameter µ; which measures the physician’s skills or knowledge to be able to perform his
tasks. We consider, however, that all the physicians share the same level of ability, which
is common-knowledge among all the agents in the model. As such, the costs of the e¤ort
exerted by the physician in each sector are given by:
ª
pb = ª(e




pv;µ) = ª((N ¡ x)b s
pv;µ):
The function ª(¢) is increasing and convex in the level of e¤ort exerted and decreasing in
the physician’s ability. Moreover, we assume that ª(0;µ) = ªei(0;µ) = 0; 8i = pb; pv:
This construction with separable e¤orts can yield situations in which the physician
may havean incentive to distribute patients and severities between the two sectors, as this
decreases his dis-utility by the total e¤ort exerted. As we will show later, this possibility
of cost-induced patient-selection is ruled out in our model by the e¤ort function we have
chosen. The fact that epb = xb spb and epv = (N ¡ x)b spv ensures that when changes in the
number of patients treated in a given sector and in their average severity, leave the cost to
this sector unaltered, then this change does not alter the costs borne in the other sector
either.
We can de…ne the utility function of the physician, as follows:
U
s = T + w(N ¡ x)¡ ª(xb s
pb;µ)¡ ª((N ¡ x)b s
pv;µ). (1)
Theaimofthis work is tostudy the potential strategic behavior that aphysicianmay have,
in his performance as a dual supplier. We, therefore, speci…cally ignore the possibility of
the physician’s strategically behaving within either sector, in the sense of exerting little
e¤ort (shirking). This is why we consider that the physician will exert the maximum level
of e¤ort that he considers compatible with his earnings, either by ethical commitment
8or because he is fully monitored. Hence, he will treat patients in the public sector as
long as his net revenues do not fall below his reservation value (normalized to zero in this
model).9
The Health Authority’s surplus derived from the care provided is given by the di¤er-
encebetweenthesocial net bene…t ofthe treatment andthe social cost that the production
of the services generates. Hence, denoting by b s the average severity of the potential pop-
ulation of patients, i.e., b s =
R ¹ s
s s 1
¢sds, the government’s objective function is as follows:




pv + w)(N ¡ x)
¤
:
Or, by re-arranging terms we get:
H = (Qb s ¡ k
pv)N ¡ [T + ¢kx +w (N ¡ x)]: (2)
Sinceall thepatients eventually receivethetreatmentthey need, maximizingthis objective
function is equivalent to minimizing the costs derived from undertaking the policy.
Note that we assume that the Health Authority does not take the utility function of
the physician into consideration. In other words, the government is not maximizing a
social welfare function.
The timing of the game is as follows: At a stage prior to the starting-point of our
model, the Health Authority and the private hospital (private physician) bargain over
the value of the private fee w that the private physician will receive per operation.10 At
the …rst stage, the Health Authority contracts a specialist, specifying the salary he will
receive (T). At the second stage, the physician takes two simultaneous decisions: On
the one hand, he selects the severities that he wants to treat in each sector. On the
other hand, he decides on the number of operations he will perform in his public duty,
and the remaining patients will be transferred to the private hospital. Finally, the whole
population of patients receives treatment and the payo¤s are realized.
We confront two di¤erent frameworks. In the …rst one, it is assumedthat the specialist
can neither control the demand for health care nor select the severities to be treated in
9In this model the physician treats all the patients he receives in the private sector. As such, there is
no room for strategic behavior in the e¤ort he exerts in his private practice.
10We show later that, in equilibrium, the bargaining set is not empty, i.e., the maximum wage the
Health Authority is willing to pay exceeds the minimum the physician will accept for attending to public
patients in his private practice.
9either system. Stage 2 is therefore only partially active in this initial set-up. In the second
scenario we consider that, since the actual severities of the patients can only be known by
specialized physicians, the Health Authority cannot monitor the physician in his selection
of the patients who are to receive treatment in either sector.
We start by analyzing the optimal policy in the …rst setting.
3 BENCHMARK SCENARIO
In this section, we assume that the Health Authority can preclude the physician’s se-
lecting the patients he wants to treat in either sector. Hence, patients will be uniformly
distributed between the public and the private sectors. We can thus ensure that the
average severity of the operations is the same in both sectors, i.e., b spb = b spv = b s.
In order to guarantee the existence of an interior solution in this framework, we make
the following assumption.
Assumption 1 0 < w ¡ ¢k < ªx(Nb s;µ):
Under Assumption 1, the di¤erence between the private fee and the treatment-cost
di¤erential has to be positive and boundedabove by a certain value. Withthis assumption
we are only requiring that: On the one hand, if the private sector is less costly in terms of
the treatment provided, we do not want this di¤erence to be so high that it compensates
the fee paid to the private physician. If this was the case, the public sector could purchase
all the health services from the private sector instead of providing them, i.e., it would be
trivially optimal to send all patients to the private sector. On the other hand, we also
require that the private fee not be so high that the policy of transferring patients is not
undertaken, even in this framework where manipulation is not possible.
Inorder tocharacterize thesolution inthis framework, we solvethe game by backwards
induction. At the second stage, the physician chooses the amount of operations he will
perform in the public sector. He will treat patients up to the point at which performing an
additional operation would force him to make a loss. Therefore, the number of operations
performed in the public sector, x, is such that ª(xb s;µ) = T. We denote it by x(T):
In the …rst stage, the Health Authority maximizes its objective function. The opti-
10mization program that the government faces is as follows:
max
T
H = (Qb s ¡ kpv)N ¡ [T + ¢kx+ w(N ¡ x)]
s.t. x = x(T):
The following lemma characterizes the optimal sharing of patients between public and
private practice and the salary that induces it.11
Lemma 1 In the benchmark scenario, the optimal number of patients treated in the public
sector (x¤) and the salary the physician receives (T¤) are such that:
ªx(x¤b s;µ)+ kpb = w +kpv;
with ª(x¤b s;µ) = T ¤:
Withthe above lemma wehave computed the optimal policy inthe First Best scenario.
This will be our reference case for comparison with the results in the next section.
The salary the Health Authority pays to the physician induces him to perform in his
public practice the number of operations that equalizes the marginal costs of treating
patients in both sectors.
It is straightforward to verify that the optimal level of patients treated in the public
sector is increasing in the physician’s ability and in the private fee w. We can also easily
see the e¤ect of the treatment-cost di¤erential. If ¢k > 0, the Health Authority incurs
a smaller cost per operation in the private sector and, hence, is willing to transfer more
patients for a given value of w. Moreover, since the fee per operation paid to the physician
in the private sector is …xed(independent ofthe patient’s severity), the optimal number of
patients treated in the public sector is decreasing in the average severity of the population
(b s).
We proceed now to study the e¤ects of dealing with a physician who can strategically
choose the kind of patients to be treated in either sector. This will allow us to analyze
the consequences of this potential strategic behavior on the willingness of the Health
Authority to undertake the policy.
11The proof of this lemma is straightforward and therefore we ommit it.
114 PATIENT SELECTION
Our concern in this section is to analyze whether the results di¤er when the physician
has the ability to select patients and decide which cases to treat in his public practice
and which go to the private sector. In other words, the Health Authority is not able to
monitor the physician’s choice of the severities of the patients treated in either sector,
and this variable cannot be included in the terms of the contract.
As we have argued in the Introduction, this is an issue of great controversy in mixed
health-care systems, as the diagnosis process that leads to the assessment of the severity of
a given patient canonly be performed by a trainedphysician. This means that the control
over the severities of the patients who receive treatment in either sector is probably not
possible for the Health Authority. Therefore, as the patients will no longer be randomly
distributed between the public and private sectors, we cannot ensure, in general, that the
average severity of the patients treated in both systems is the same.
To characterize the solution in this framework, we proceed to solve again the game
by backwards induction. At the second stage, the physician decides on the amount of
operations he will perform in the public sector. His optimal number of operations does








= T and we




The physician also decides which severities he wants to treat in either sector, subject
to the restriction that x
¡
T;b spb¢
operations have to be performed in his public practice.
Therefore, he does not have complete freedom in the choice of b spb; as there may be values
that are not compatible with the sharing of patients set. The physician will choose the
value of b spb (and therefore also of b spv) in order to maximize his total revenue. Since he
is a dual supplier, he will consider the e¤ects of his strategic behavior concerning his two
sources of income. Therefore, the program he faces is:
max
b spb U
s = T + w(N ¡ x) ¡ ª(xb s
pb;µ) ¡ ª((N ¡ x)b s
pv;µ)





In the following proposition we characterize the physician’s behavior concerning the
selection of patients.
12Proposition 1 For a given sharing of patients between the two sectors (x and N ¡ x),
the specialist will transfer the least severe cases to the private practice. Formally:









This proposition shows that the physician wants to treat only the mildest cases in the
private practice, leavingthe most di¢cultones for thepublic sector. This behavior, known
in the literature as “cream-skimming”, is caused primarily by the di¤erence between the
physician’s remunerations from the two systems. In the public sector, the physician
receives a salary whereas, in the private sector, his earnings are on a …xed fee-for-service
basis. Therefore, the more operations the physician performs in his private practice, the
higher the earnings he obtains. Furthermore, for a given level of e¤ort exerted, (i.e., for a
given cost), the “easier” the operations he performs the more patients he can treat. Note
that we are not facing a situation of cost-induced patient-selection. Cream-skimming
appears in our model not as an attempt by the physician to incur smaller costs, but
rather as a way of increasing his earnings.




that simultaneously ful…ll the following conditions:







In our framework, cream-skimming cannot be avoided as the government is not able
to monitor the physician choice of the severities to treat and, the contract, hence, cannot
be contingent on the severities to be treated in the public sector. This set-up, however, is
consistent withwhat oneobserves in mostmixedhealth-care systems, wherethephysicians
earna salary that is not contingent onthe number of patients they treat or their severities.
We shall now study how this problem of cream-skimming a¤ects the decision of the
Health Authority on when to undertake such a policy, and how to distribute the patients
between the two sectors.
In the …rst stage, when the cost of implementing the policy is being considering, the
Health Authority should take the fact that the most severe cases will be treated in the
public sector into account.
13The maximization program of the Health Authority in this scenario is as follows:
max
T








b spb = ¹ s ¡ ¢sx
2N :
(4)
The following lemma provides the interior candidate for solution in this framework. Note
that when the patient-selection arises, the Health Authority’s objective function is much
more complicated. In particular, it is no longer true that the function is always concave.
The …rst order necessary condition for optimality is, therefore, not su¢cient in general.12
Lemma 2 With patient-selection, in the interior candidate for solution, the number of


















= Tm and b spb = ¹ s ¡ ¢sxm
2N :
With patient-selection, new e¤ects appear in the Health Authority’s …rst order condi-
tion which will determine the optimal policy. The cost per operation in the public sector
has now increased, as the average severity of the patients treated there is higher. This
makes the treatment provided by the public sector more expensive and, hence, leads to
a greater transfer of patients to private practice. An additional e¤ect, which goes in





re‡ects how an increase in
the number of operations in the public sector has a positive impact on the public costs
(through the decrease it induces in the average severity of the patients treated there).
To be able to close the model and perform comparisons with the benchmark case, we
need to consider a speci…c cost of e¤ort function. This will allow us to characterize the
e¤ects of the cream-skimming phenomenon on the behavior of the government and on its
willingness to undertake the policy.
12Moreover, we need to impose a regularity condition in the cost of e¤ort function to ensure that the












> 0 for every x 2 [0;N]; an interior candidate for optimum exists. Under
this condition, the proof of the lemma is straightforward and is therefore omitted.
14Hence, hereinafter, the dis-utility of the physician’s e¤orts in either sector is given by:










Before proceeding to analyze the optimal response from the Health Authority, we need to
study the curvature of its objective function. Since the amount of patients that receive
public treatment is determined by the salary the physician receives, it is equivalent to
the Health Authority’s deciding directly on the salary or on the number of patients to be
treated. For the sake of notational clarity, let d = ¢s
b s denote the relative dispersion of the
patients’ severities. The following lemma characterizes the curvature as a function of x.
Lemma 3 The curvature of the Health Authority’s objective function, under patient-
selection (Hm), is as follows:
1. If d ￿ 4¡ 2
p
3; then Hm is always concave.
2. If d > 4 ¡ 2
p
3; then:




; Hm is concave at x.
(b) For any x 2
¡¹ ¯(d)N; N
¤
, Hm is convex at x.









3 , ¹ ¯
0 (d) < 0.
Lemma 3 allows us to study the curvature of the population’s health function, interms
of the relative dispersion of the patients’ severities, measured as the ratio of the di¤erence
between the boundary severities (¹ s and s) and the average severity (b s). This lemma high-
lights the relevance of the relative dispersion, as it is a measure of howserious the problem
of cream-skimming is. The strategic behavior of the physician (in transferring the mildest
cases to the private practice) is fostered by the wide range of severities, since his gains in
diverting patients are higher. We show that when the relative dispersion of the severities
is low, the objective function is still concave in the entire domain. Thus, when the Health
Authority does not su¤er much from the problem of patient-selection, the program has
a unique candidate to optimum. If the severities are su¢ciently dispersed, however, the
objective function has a convex section, that is bigger the higher the dispersion is. As a
15consequence of this feature, we may have two candidates to optimum: an interior one and
the boundary solution (no transfer of patients to private practice).
The following proposition presents the solution to the government’s maximization
problem.
Proposition 2 In the presence of patient-selection, the Health Authority decides, through
the choice of the salary, to undertake the policy of transferring patients to private practice
if the value of the private fee isbelow a certain threshold. The higher the relative dispersion
of the patients’ severities is, the more demanding this condition is . Formally:
1. Tm is such that xm < N if w ¡ ¢k < b s2N
µ2 G(d):













2 if d ￿ 4¡ 2
p
3
g(d) if d ¸ 4¡ 2
p
3
is a continuous function and g(d) is such
that g0(d) < 0 and lim
d!1
g (d) = 1
2:
This result shows that the presence of “cream-skimming” can lead to a situation in
which the Health Authority is no longer willing to transfer patients to the private sector.
It is straightforward to verify that, for this particular e¤ort cost function that we have
considered here, in the absence of patient-selection, the decision of the Health Authority
will be to distribute patients between the two sectors as long as w ¡ ¢k < b s2N
µ2 = ¹ w
(and, by Assumption 1, this condition always holds). If patient-selection by the physician
cannot be avoided, this condition is more demanding. For the government to undertake
this policy of distribution of patients between sectors, the upper bound of the private fee




µ2 since G(d) is always less than one).







Health Authority is completely eliminating the possibility of patient-selection. Inducing
the physician (through the salary it pays to him) to treat all the patients in the public
sector, there is no chance ofavoiding the mildest cases. When the private fee is su¢ciently
low, however, the Health Authority decides to su¤er the “cream-skimming” problem, in
order to bear a lower cost for the patients transferred.
Moreover, the threshold of the private fee from which the Health Authority is willing
to carry out the policy, is decreasing in the relative dispersion of the patients’ severities.
16When the relative dispersion of the severities is low, the Health Authority does not su¤er
the problem of cream-skimming very much (since all the patients have similar levels of
severity). In this case, the policy of transferring patients to private practice is undertaken
for a wide range of values of w. In particular, when d ! 0, the condition for undertaking
the policy converges to the one required in Assumption 1. However, as the relative
dispersion of the severities increases, the condition necessary for the public authority to
reach agreements with private hospitals becomes more demanding. Since the treatment
of some patients in the private sector increases the cost per operation in the public sector,
the policy is not undertaken unless the private fee is su¢ciently low.
We now compare the interior solution in this setting to the optimal one in the bench-
mark case.
Proposition 3 When the Health Authority is willing to undertake the policy, the exis-
tence of patient-selection implies that:
i).- If the relative dispersion of the severities is su¢ciently low, the Health Authority
induces a higher transfer of patients to private practice, provided that the private fee is
below a certain value. Otherwise, there is a lower transfer.
ii).- If the relative dispersion of the severities exceeds a critical value, the Health Au-
thority always induces a higher transfer of patients to private practice.
Formally:
1. xm < x¤; when d ¸ :7625 and when d < :7625 and w ¡ ¢k < b s2N
µ2 ©(d):












This proposition shows that when the policy of transferring patients is undertaken,
the consequences of the cream-skimming on the number of patients transferred di¤er in
the relative dispersion of the severities. This result is a consequence of two contrary
e¤ects. On the one hand, the marginal cost of treating an extra patient in the public
sector is higher with patient-selection, as the average severity of the patients treated is
higher. On the other hand, by increasing the number of operations in the public sector we
not only save the private fee (w), but also reduce the possibility of cream-skimming and,
hence, decrease the expected level of severity that the Health Authority faces. When the
17relative dispersion is su¢ciently high, the negative e¤ect of treating patients in the public
sector always dominates and, thus, fewer patients are kept in the public sector, even if
we already know that this increases the capacity of the physicians to select patients. In
contrast, when the relative dispersion is low, the …nal result is determined by the value
of the private fee. A high level of w implied a relatively low transfer of patients in the
benchmark scenario; we show that, in this case, the presence of cream-skimming leads
to an even smaller transfer. Conversely, when the …rst best situation was to transfer
a high proportion of the patients (low w) to private practice, the distortion implies to
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Figure 1: Comparison of the solutions with patient selection (xm) and without it (x¤).
Proposition 3 can also be interpreted in terms of the salary paid to the physician.
In this dimension, however, it is more di¢cult to obtain the sign of the distortion. The
reason for this is that, when the presence of cream-skimming induces a higher transfer of
patients to private practice, two e¤ects come intocon‡ict: First, fewer patients are treated
in the public sector, which implies lower costs for the physician and a smaller salary, and
secondly, the patients who are treated are relatively more severe (hence, they induce a
higher salary to cover the physician’s e¤ort cost). As a result, the impact of patient-
selection on the salary the physician receives is ambiguous in this region. Nevertheless,
when the relative dispersion of the severities is low, and the private fee su¢ciently high,
there is no such ambiguity. In equilibrium, fewer patients are transferred to the private
18sector. Moreover, dueto patient-selection, the patients who are left in the publicsector are
the most severe ones. In this region, therefore, the existence of cream-skimming induces
the Health Authority to pay a higher salary to the physician.
Figure 2 compares the objective functions of the Health Authority and the optimal
sharing of patients under the alternative scenarios we have studied: H¤ denotes the ob-
jective function in the benchmark case, whereas Hm stands for the one under patient-
selection. This illustration is made for the case in which the policy is implemented and










Figure 2: Health Authority’s objective functions when d > :7625:
We have considered the negotiations between the government and private hospitals,
about the value of the fee to be paid per operation performed in the private sector, as
given in our model. It is crucial, however, to know whether the equilibrium values we
have computed leave room for such a bargaining process. That is, if there are values of w
thatmake theHealth Authority willing toundertake the policy
³
i.e. w ¡ ¢k < b s2N
µ2 G(d)
´
and, at the same time, are acceptable to the physician
³






result is presented in the following remark:
Remark 1 In equilibrium, and for ¢k ¸ 0; the bargaining set is not empty (for every
value of d), i.e., the maximum wage the Health Authority is willing to pay exceeds the
minimum that the physician requires to accept public patients in his private practice.
This remark shows that if the private sector is not more ine¢cient than the public
sector is, we can ensure that there are values ofw that are both physicianand government
19compatible, independently of the relative dispersion of the severities. If ¢k < 0, there
also exists room for negotiation, provided the relative dispersion of the severities is not
too high. Figure 3 illustrates the bargaining set between the Health Authority and the
physician for ¢k ¸ 0:
w-Dk
w
Maximum private fee the H.A is
willing to pay




Figure 3: Bargaining Set for values of ¢k ¸ 0:
5 COMMENTS AND EXTENSIONS
In this paper we have shown that when physicians are dual providers, a problem of
cream-skimming may arise. This strategic behavior makes the government less willing to
undertake a policy of transferring some of the public sector’s patients to private hospitals.
When the policy is undertaken, however, in most of the domain of the variables, more
patients are …nally treated in private practice than in the absence of cream-skimming.
Inthis section, we discuss someofthe ingredients of our model by proposing alternative
constructions and providing insights into their impact on the results. In particular, we
introduce modi…cations that a¤ect the structure of the costs of treatment in the public
sector, and allow for heterogeneous physicians in the model.
5.1 Cost of Public Treatment
Our assumption of a constant marginal cost of treatment in the public sector, was made
for the sake of clarity in the presentation. The construction we have chosen allows us to
20concentrate on the physician’s incentives in selecting patients and to fully characterize
the Health Authority’s response to such behavior.
Nevertheless, other more general structures can be considered for the costs. The
alternatives that we have in mind are: (1) Marginal cost of treatment increasing with the
average severity of the patients; (2) Marginal costs increasing in the number of treatments
provided (dis-economies of scale); and (3) Capacity constraints in the public sector.
In all these set-ups, the incentives of the physician to select patients remain unaltered
and, hence, the same problem of cream-skimming arises. Moreover, the crucial measure
for assessing the seriousness of the problem continues to be the relative dispersion of
the severities. Even if the government’s reaction is not qualitatively altered, there are
quantitative di¤erences in the results arrived at under these di¤erent cost structures.
The …rst two alternatives considered (marginal costs increasing with the severity or in
thenumber ofoperations) alter thecurvature ofthe HealthAuthority’s objectivefunction.
Even if the curvature cannot be fully characterized now, the e¤ect of the change in the
cost structureon theresults is clear. Whenthe marginal costs increase with the severity of
the patients, the presence of cream-skimming fosters the non-concavity of the function, as
it increases the average severity in the public sector. Consequently, the boundary solution
(not undertaking the policy) is more likely to prevail. On the contrary, when the costs
are convex in the number of operations, it results in an impulse of the concavity of the
program and, hence, in a reduction of the region where the boundary solution is optimal.
To analyze the situation where public costs are a¤ected by capacity constraints, we
consider the simplest structure, i.e., costs that are linear in the number of patients, but
withthe costparameter increasing whenthe number of operations exceed acertain thresh-
old. Formally, there exists a level of operations ¹ x < N such that if x < ¹ x; the costs are
k
pb
1 x; while, if x > ¹ x, total costs are k
pb
1 ¹ x + k
pb




1 : In this set-up,
the analysis of the curvature of the objective function is not di¤erent from that of our
original model. The only di¤erence is that, under this new cost structure, the boundary
solution becomes more costly, since it implies bearing the cost of a higher extra capacity.
The condition for the Health Authority to be willing to carry out the policy is, therefore,
less demanding here than it was in the original model.
215.2 Heterogeneous Physicians
Our analysis assumes that all physicians have the same level of ability and, therefore, this
level is observable by the Health Authority (or, what is equivalent, to considering a single
physician).
There are two reasons for choosing such a set-up: First, we wanted to focus on the
potential strategic behavior that a physician may have in his performance as a dual
supplier. We, therefore, speci…cally ignored the possibility of the physician to strategically
behave within each sector, in the sense of his exerting a low level of e¤ort or shirking o¤.
Dealing with homogeneous physicians allows us to avoid the additional problems derived
from the physician’s having a double strategic behavior.
Secondly, we wanted to study physicians’ incentives to select patients under a …xed
contractual structure that is close to the one we observe in many mixed health care
systems. Under these schemes, the earnings of the physicians in either sector are the
same, independently of their type.
There is a general consensus in the literature, however, concerning the problems that
the di¤erent degrees of information of the agents involved in the provision of health care
generate (for an overview of principal-agent theory, see La¤ont and Tirole (1993)). To be
more speci…c, the providers of medical services generally have more information than the
government does, concerning their own skills, i.e., their capacity to treat the patients at
a given cost of e¤ort. The important question here, therefore, is whether our results are
robust in the existence of heterogeneous physicians. This would introduce a problem of
adverse selection in the model, in addition to the one of patient-selection.
Let us now consider two types of physicians: a “high skilled” physician (µ = µh) and a
“lowskilled” one (µ = µl). Earning a …xed salary is not incentive compatible for the “high
skilled” physician, since he can pretend to be “low skilled” and reduce the dis-utility of
his e¤ort.
To solve this problem and concentrate on patient-selection, a truthful-revelation con-
tract should be designed. A contract that ensures the honest revelation by the doctor
should include two components: a …xed salary and a bonus. The Health Authority would
o¤er a contract f(Th;Bh);(Tl;Bl)g to the physician, under which he receives a salary Th,
plus a bonus Bh, if he announces µh as his level of ability, and analogously for (Tl;Bl). The
bonus is included to induce a high skilled physician to sign his contract. In equilibrium,
22then, it is strictly positive for the high type (informational rent) and zero for the lowtype.
Under this new sort of contract, however, (and maintaining the same reimbursement
scheme in the private sector), the incentives for the physician to select patients remain
unaltered. Only the high skilled physician receives a bonus, but this does not depend
on his decision regarding the selection of patients. The magnitude of his informational
rents is only a¤ected by the decision taken by the low skilled physician. The problem of
cream-skimming is, therefore, the same under adverse selection.
The reaction of the Health Authority, however, di¤ers. When the government does
not observe the physician’s ability, a new e¤ect appears: its incentives to undertake the
policy of distributing patients between the two sectors increase, even in the presence
of cream-skimming. This e¤ect is due to the fact that the physician’s informational
advantage allows him to earn informational rents, which can be reduced by transferring
more patients to the private sector. Even if sending less patients to private practice
alleviates the problem of cream-skimming, it raises the value of the bonus received by the
high skilled physician and is, therefore, more costly. As a consequence of this, there is a
range of parameter values (in particular, private fees) for which the policy of distributing
patients between the private and the public sectors is only optimal when the Health
Authority su¤ers from asymmetric information about the physician’s ability. The Health
Authority is more willing to undertake the policy, as it is a way of relaxing the agency
problem su¤ered and “transferring” the informational disadvantage to the private sector.
236 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY IM-
PLICATIONS
The motivation behind this study was the enormous congestion that exists in public
health services worldwide, which has forced several Health Authorities to devise especial
programs to alleviate it. Temporary programs, however, may be extremely costly and,
hence, the study of the regularity and adequacy of the measures undertaken becomes a
major concern.
We have analyzed a situation in which the Health Authority undertakes a policy to
reduce the proportion of patients that remain untreated, transferring a fraction of such
cases to private hospitals. We have shown that a problem of cream-skimming arises.
Due to the di¤erent structure of the physician’s remuneration in either system, specialists
prefer to treat only the mildest cases in their own private practices. We have, then, shown
how this problem makes the Health Authority be more reluctant to implement this policy.
We have also characterized the range of parameters that makes the Health Authority
…nd it more pro…table to treat all of its patients in the public sector. Moreover, we
found that the crucial variable that measures the importance of the problem the Health
Authority faces is the relative dispersion of the patients’ severities.
When the policy is undertaken, we study the e¤ects of patient-selection on the amount
of patients that are …nally transferred to the private sector. We also …nd that the results
are ambiguous. When the relative dispersion of the severities is high enough, the negative
e¤ect of treating patients with higher average severities in the public sector always domi-
nates. More patients are, therefore, sent to private hospitals. When we deal with medical
disciplines in which the dispersion of the severities is low, the result is determined by the
value of the private fee. In this case, the behavior of the Health Authority is always more
extreme than in the absence of cream-skimming.
Our analysis provides some policy recommendations concerning the optimality of this
kind of measures. When designing a policy to transfer patients from the public to the
private sector, the policy-maker should consider the fact that the di¤erence that exists
between the reimbursement systems of the two sectors can create perverse incentives for
the physicians. To be more speci…c, if the reimbursement rule in the public sector is a
…xed salary, while in the private practice functions on a fee-for-service basis, as is the case
24in several countries where mixed health-care systems exist, a problem of cream-skimming
arises. The physicians transfer the mildest cases to the private practice, thus increasing
the cost per operation borne by the public sector.
Our results suggest that the decision to undertake the policy or not is also in‡uenced
by another important issue, apart from the fee per operation agreed with the private
sector. The type of illness and, in particular, how disperse the severities of the patients
are is shown to be very important. The wider the range of severities, the more serious the
problem of patient-selection becomes and, therefore, the less likely it is that the policy
will be undertaken.
Moreover, empirical evidence shows that when a policy of sending some patients to
private hospitals is implemented, the number of operations that are …nally performed
in the public sector slightly decreases. These empirical …ndings are consistent with our
results. In our model, this is because the patients who remain in the public sector are
more costly. In equilibrium, except for a small region of the parameter values, the imple-
mentation of the policy generates a reduction in the number of operations performed in
the public sector. In the region where this does not hold, the Health Authority reacts to
the selection of patients by paying the physician a higher salary.
We havechosen towork withauniform distributionofpatients’ severities foranalytical
convenience, even though a distribution in which the severities are more concentrated
around the mean might seem to be more realistic. However, we guess that this would not
alter the main features of the model. There would be incentives for patient-selection, and
the other results should not be qualitatively altered.
Finally, it is worth noting that all of the analysis we have performed, are done under
the assumption that there is no di¤erence between the quality of the services provided by
thepublic and private sectors. This assumption is reasonable forthe kind of treatments we
consider (non-urgent elective surgery). In fact, at least in Spain, the patients who demand
elective surgery are those who are transferred from the public to the private sector. This
assumption would be clearly inappropriate for modelling other kinds of illnesses that
require very expensive or high-tech treatment. To include these medical disciplines in the
analysis would require a model with heterogenous quality among the di¤erent providers.
25Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
At stage 2, the reduced form of the optimization program the physician faces is as
follows:
max
b spb Us = T + w(N ¡ x) ¡ ª(xb spb;µ) ¡ ª((N ¡ x)b spv;µ)





The derivative is given by:
@Us








dª((N ¡ x)b spv;µ)
db spb : (5)
By stage 3 we know that 8b spb; x = x
¡
T;b spb¢












is constant with respect to b spb.
Since s s U(s; ¹ s), b spb and b spv are related by the following equation:
b spb x
N
+ b spv(N ¡ x)
N
= b s:
From the above expression we get:
b spv(N ¡ x) = b sN ¡ b spbx:









db spb = 0:
Therefore, condition (5) is reduced to:
@Us
@b spb = ¡w
dx
db spb;
and from here it is straightforward that:
@Us
@b spb > 0; 8b s
pb:
The physician would like to treat the patients with the highest average severity in the
public sector.
26We can write b spb, using the formula for the conditional expectation. We let C be
the subset of severities treated in the public sector (for a given number of operations x).
Formally:









For a givenvalue of Pr(C) = x
N this expectation is increasing inthe locationof C in (s; ¹ s).
Thus, b spb is maximum when C is maximized in the interval (s; ¹ s), from which we get that
C =
¡
¹ s ¡ ¢sx
N ;¹ s
¢
: Therefore, the physician chooses to treat the patients with severities in
the range
¡
s; ¹ s ¡ ¢sx
N
¢
in the private sector and leaves those in the interval
¡
¹ s ¡ ¢sx
N ; ¹ s
¢
in
the public sector: This implies that, in equilibrium, b spb and x are such that:
b s







This completes the proof. ¥
Proof of Lemma 3:
We study the curvature of the Health Authority’s objective function in the restricted
domain given by the behavior of the physician at stage 2. From this stage we know that





= T and that b spb = ¹ s¡
¢sx
2N : By substituting these two constraints
in the program, we will characterize the curvature of the objective function as a function
of x: The optimization program at the …rst stage is as follows:
max
x
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27This derivative is increasing in ¯: We compute its roots and we …nd:




















3 = ¹ ¯(d): It is straightforward to see that ¹ ¯
0(d) < 0.
From here, and taking into account that ¯ ￿ 1 since x ￿ N; it can be shown that:
i) If ¹ ¯(d) ¸ 1; @2Hm
@2x < 0 8x 2 [0;N], i.e., the objective function is always concave.
ii) If ¹ ¯(d) < 1; @2H
m








In re-writing the conditions for ¹ ¯ (d) in terms of the relative dispersion ofthe severities,
we …nd that:
¹ ¯ (d) ¸ 1 , d ￿ 4¡ 2
p
3 and
¹ ¯ (d) < 1 , d > 4¡ 2
p
3.
This completes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2:
From the f.o.c computed in Lemma 3 it is straightforward to verify that x = 0 can be
never a solution, since:
@Hm
@x jx=0
= w ¡ ¢k > 0:
This, together with the other conditions found in Lemma 3, provides a complete charac-
terization of the optimization problem:
1.-If d ￿ 4¡ 2
p
3, there exists a unique candidate to optimum (x). This solution will
be interior, i.e., x 2 (0;N); if and only if:
@Hm
@x jx=N



















2.-If d > 4 ¡ 2
p
3, there exists, at most, a single interior candidate to optimum (x),
such that x 2
¡
0; ¹ ¯ (d)N
¤









3 . The boundary solution x = N is
also a potential candidate to optimum, provided that:
@Hm
@x jx=N








This is a necessary, although not su¢cient condition, for x = N to be a solution. Hence,
to choose the optimal level of x in this region we need to compare the value function for
28both candidates. We check the conditions under which it is better to operate on a fraction
® of the patients, rather than perform N operations. We …nd that:
If w ¡ ¢k <
b s2N
µ












9®¤ 2 (0;1) such that Hm(x = ®¤N) > Hm(x = N):




If w¡¢k exceeds the above threshold, then we can ensure that the boundary solution
is optimal, since for this parameter con…guration @Hm
@x jx=N > 0: Therefore, the solution to
the principal’s problem is:








2 if d ￿ 4¡ 2
p
3
g(d) if d ¸ 4¡ 2
p
3
is a continuous function and g(d) is such that





ii) xm = N; otherwise.
And this completes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3:
From the previous Proposition we know that xm is interior if:
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From the inequality above we …nd that:
@Hm
@x jx=x¤ > 0 ()













In order to complete the characterization of the solution xm; we need to check when the
inequality above is compatible with the condition guaranteeing that xm is interior. On
combining the above condition with that of Proposition 2, we …nd that:
1) When d < :7625:















d2 +4d + 36
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And this completes the proof. ¥
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